Self-Generated or Cue-Induced—Different Kinds of Expectations to Be Considered by Maike Kemper & Robert Gaschler
OPINION
published: 24 January 2017
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00053
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 January 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 53
Edited by:
Anna Thorwart,
University of Marburg, Germany
Reviewed by:
Mike Le Pelley,









This article was submitted to
Cognition,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 30 September 2016
Accepted: 10 January 2017
Published: 24 January 2017
Citation:
Kemper M and Gaschler R (2017)
Self-Generated or
Cue-Induced—Different Kinds of





Expectations to Be Considered
Maike Kemper 1* and Robert Gaschler 2
1 Interdisciplinary Research Cluster on Image, Knowledge, Gestaltung, Department of Psychology, Humboldt-Universität zu
Berlin, Berlin, Germany, 2 Interdisciplinary Research Cluster on Image, Knowledge, Gestaltung, Department of Psychology,
FernUniversität in Hagen, Hagen, Germany
Keywords: stimulus expectation, self-generated expectations, predictions, cue-induced expectations, violation of
expectation
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SELF-GENERATED AND
CUE-INDUCED EXPECTATIONS
Expectations can help humans to adequately prepare for action. Cognitive psychology has inspired
studies on the influence of expectations on the course of scientific discovery (Klein and Roodman,
2005; Rzhetsky et al., 2006; Brewer, 2012). Violations of expectations in research often fail to
provoke changes in theorizing and research practices. While expectations have been dissociated
from other processes such as automatic response activation (Perruchet et al., 2006), relatively
little attention has been devoted to reflecting on the different forms of expectation or different
methods used to study expectations (and their violations). In this opinion paper, we highlight some
early work (Acosta, 1982) and later contributions that have the potential to violate researchers’
expectations on what seems the most suitable methodology for operationalizing expectations in the
cognitive psychology lab.
In behavioral research, expectations are most often operationalized by assessing performance
differences between trials in which expectations are met and trials in which expectations are
violated. Neurophysiological data can assess dynamics before stimulus onset (e.g., Mattler et al.,
2006; Kemper et al., 2012), and the mismatch effect shows that response times are faster and
error rates lower for expected events (compared to when an expectation is violated). This can
be demonstrated for expectations about stimuli (Posner and Snyder, 1975; Mattler, 2004), as well
as to-be-performed tasks in task switching studies (Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 1996).
Furthermore, expectations canmodulate the impact of cognitive conflicts (Duthoo et al., 2013, for a
study on expectations in the Stroop task). The Gratton effect is a change in the strength of a conflict
effect depending on the amount of cognitive conflict in previous trials. It has been described as an
expectation effect (Gratton et al., 1992; see also Botvinick et al., 1999; Braver, 2012; but see e.g.,
Mayr et al., 2003; Schmidt and Weissman, 2016, for alternative interpretations).
Many studies use cues to induce stimulus expectations (Posner and Snyder, 1975; Shulman
et al., 1999; Mattler, 2004; Oswal et al., 2007) and task expectations (Rogers and Monsell, 1995;
Meiran, 1996). Other methods of inducing expectations include presentation of subliminal stimuli
(Kunde, 2004) or irrelevant flankers (Nattkemper et al., 2010; Ziessler and Nattkemper, 2011). At
first sight inducing expectations seems to offer a greater degree of experimental control compared
to allowing participants to form their own expectations. By inducing expectations, experimenters
can determine in advance how often which cue is used and how often the upcoming event violates
vs. matches the expectation that the cue should induce. However, studies of stimulus expectations
show stronger behavioral (Acosta, 1982) as well as EEG effects (Kemper et al., 2012) for self-
generated compared to cue-induced expectations. This suggests that self-generated expectations
might nonetheless be preferable, as they induce larger, and therefore more easily detectable, effects.
In a self-generated expectation condition, participants are prompted to verbalize their
expectation (e.g., “shape?”). They verbalize which of the stimuli from the set (e.g., “circle”) they
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are expecting to appear in the current trial. In a cuing variant, the
participants are shown a picture of a circle or the word “circle”
(cf. Kemper et al., 2012) and verbalize it. Next, the stimulus is
shown and the response is collected. One early example hinting
at a qualitative difference between self-generated vs. cue-induced
expectations was reported by Acosta (1982). For mismatches,
larger stimulus set sizes led to longer response times, for self-
generated and cue-induced expectations alike, whereas for match
trials, set size effects differed between cue-induced and self-
generated expectations. Reaction times for stimuli that matched
the cue were longer if more stimuli were used. For self-generated
expectations, set size had only a minor influence. Presumably,
the expected stimulus was strongly activated regardless of
whether there were many or few alternative stimuli. In addition,
Acosta (1982) reported evidence that violations of self-generated
expectations have a stable effect when prolonging the interval
between generation of the expectation and stimulus presentation
whereas cue-induced expectations diminish relatively quickly
for prolonged intervals. Stronger effects of violations of self-
generated compared to cue-induced expectations have not only
been obtained for expectations of stimuli. They were also found
when expectations concerned a more abstract level of task
processing, such as the conflict level of the upcoming trial (e.g.,
expecting a congruent vs. an incongruent Stroop trial; Kemper
et al., 2016). Specifically, expecting the repetition of a congruent
trial led to faster processing, while expecting conflict did not
enhance performance (e.g., Duthoo et al., 2013). A modulation
was found for self-generated expectations only.
Stronger effects of self-generated compared to cue-induced
expectations can be attributed to (a) differences in strength and
(b) likelihood of engagement. While there is evidence that cues
can be ignored (especially in case of low validity; cf. Alpay et al.,
2009), even chance-level validity leads to strong effects of self-
generated expectations (e.g., Acosta, 1982; Kemper et al., 2012,
2016; Gaschler et al., 2014). This suggests that self-generated
expectations cannot be ignored (see Schwager et al., 2016, for
a current test of boundary conditions), whereas participants
presumably fail to attend to or use cues of low validity in many of
the trials. Based on this, and on the lack of a set size effect reported
by Acosta (1982), Gaschler et al. (2014) suggested that the object
of expectation becomes represented in the focus of attention
in working memory (cf. Oberauer et al., 2013) in the case of
self-generated expectations (but only occasionally so in the case
of cues). This representation is accessible for verbal report,
which implies that verbalizations are a rather direct measure
of self-generated expectations. The stimulus representation that
is activated more strongly than the others (if only by a small
margin) can be selected for report.
More specifically, there is evidence for the assumption that
this privileged form of representation is a by-product of self-
assessing what one is currently expecting. Strong RT benefits
for the stimulus that one says one is not expecting (Hacker
and Hinrichs, 1979) or is expecting second most (Hacker and
Hinrichs, 1974) suggest that the focus of attention in working
memory is filled with the object one considers when self-assessing
what one is currently expecting. Thus, researchers should take
into account that self-generated verbalized expectations might
not only serve as a measure of expectation, but also as a
means of boosting expectation effects. Based on the evidence
gathered so far, it is difficult to determine whether a stronger
effect is in general desirable to increase the internal validity
of the experiment or whether this comes at the cost of results
that are only representative for the specific situation in which
participants are required to form and verbalize an expectation.
Studies that directly compare self-generated expectations when
participants are either triggered to form them or can form them
spontaneously have so far not been conducted. They might
become possible using neurophysiological multivariate pattern




Self-generated expectations allow experimenters to track how
violations of expectations influence the formation of future
expectations. For example, expectations about the conflict level
of an upcoming trial are highly dependent on the conflict level
of the previous run of trials. For instance, participants expect
a repetition of a conflict trial after one single conflict trial.
However, the more conflict trials that have occurred in a row,
the stronger participants show a gambler’s fallacy and expect a
congruent trial next (Jiménez and Méndez, 2013, 2014; Kemper
et al., 2016). It is possible that violations of expectations operate
like a conflict cue for processing in the upcoming trial. Exploring
this possibility might help to further understand the differences
between cue-induced and self-generated expectations.
In addition to effects of violation of expectation on
future expectations that depend on the last (few) trial(s),
stimulus probability influences the overall percentage in which
participants predict each stimulus (e.g., Kemper et al., 2012). The
phenomenon of probability matching (e.g., Umbach et al., 2012)
suggests that self-generated expectations are not strategically
chosen to optimize performance. For instance, if Stimulus A
is 70% likely and Stimulus B is only 30% likely, probability
matching means that participants will anticipate Stimulus A on
70% of the trials, and anticipate Stimulus B on 30% of the
trials, even though to optimize performance (by optimizing the
number of trials in which expectation and stimulus match) the
best solution is to anticipate Stimulus A on 100% of the trials.
In principle, participants could exclusively verbalize that they
are expecting the frequent stimulus. This would maximize the
number of match trials and should improve performance. Such
strategic effects would undermine the credibility of verbalizations
as a valid measure of expectations. However, participants match
their expectations to the probabilities of stimuli instead of
minimizing expectation violations (e.g., Kemper et al., 2012;
Umbach et al., 2012). Expectations seem to be influenced by
and to reflect stimulus frequencies. Future research should
explore whether this influence is in part the result of (other)
strategic effects. For example, participants might aim to match
verbalization frequencies to stimulus frequencies in an attempt to
obtain match trials even for the infrequent stimuli. In addition,
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probability matching can be an effect of the search for patterns
(Gaissmaier and Schooler, 2008).
So far, the evidence for strategic effects is limited. The
mismatch effect is stable with practice and of similar strength
for frequent and infrequent stimuli, even though violations
of expectations are much more likely for infrequent than
for frequent stimuli (e.g., Umbach et al., 2012). Frequent
violation of an expectation does not influence how strongly that
expectation is relied upon in future trials. However, validity
might have a different effect on cue induced than on self-
generated expectations. Cues show larger mismatch effects when
they are relatively valid (i.e., when the expectation is violated less
often) and mismatch effects become very small for cues with low
validity (e.g., Vossel et al., 2006).
CONCLUSIONS FOR RESEARCH ON
(THE VIOLATION OF) EXPECTATIONS
Self-generated expectations show stronger effects than cue-
induced expectations in a number of experimental setups, and
measure expectations more effectively relative to cues. People
still rely on self-generated expectations even if they are violated
often (e.g., are of low validity in a long experiment). We suggest
that researchers should take into account that the choice between
self-generated and cue-induced expectations entails a tradeoff
between the strength of the expectation effect and the degree
of experimental control over expectations in individual trials.
In addition, since internally-generated expectations may differ
qualitatively from those induced by cues, it cannot be taken for
granted that results obtained with one method can be generalized
to situations involving the other.
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